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Sommario
Questo lavoro di tesi tratta l’implementazione di un’applicazione decen-
tralizzata in grado di certificare eventi accaduti nel mondo reale, compiuti
da parte di un’organizzazione. Tali certificati devono essere (i) verificabili
da chiunque, in un qualsiasi momento della storia e senza la necessità di
terze parti, (ii) avere un costo di rilascio ragionevole per l’autore e (iii), avere
tempi di conferma accettabili. Per poter definire meglio (a) le modalità in
cui è possibile farlo, (b) l’esito del lavoro svolto ed eventuali problemi emersi,
e (c) i futuri sviluppi, la tesi si prefissa i seguenti obiettivi. Verrà discusso in
che modo un generico protocollo Blockchain si inserisce nell’ambito dei sis-
temi distribuiti. L’avvento di Bitcoin infatti, permette per la prima volta di
implementare un sistema distribuito e decentralizzato, in cui è possibile avere
fiducia tanto quanto necessario per eseguire transazioni finanziarie. Verranno
individuate le proprietà che un protocollo deve avere per garantire sicurezza,
e se possono essere raggiunte contemporaneamente. Nello stesso modo in cui
i protocolli blockchain esistono ”sopra” le reti peer-to-peer, verrà descritto
il modo in cui gli Smartcontracts possono essere introdotti nelle blockchain.
Verrà visto come questi costrutti rendono possibile l’implementazione di Ap-
plicazioni Decentralizzate (dapp). Si vedrà che tali registri distribuiti e pub-
blici, sono comunque in una fase di sviluppo piuttosto immatura e presen-
tano alcuni problemi. Fra questi, quello della scalabilità all’aumentare degli
utenti. Verrà visto il motivo, e il modo in cui questo problema interferisce
con l’operatività della dapp realizzata.

Introduction
Reaching global consensus about facts within a distributed system, with
no trusted authority has always been a problem. The advent of Bitcoin [2]
and its consensus algorithm, is the result of various attempts to solve the
digital currency double-spending problem, in a completely decentralized sys-
tem for payments. For the first time indeed, the participants of a system are
able to agree about a ledger of totally ordered events, with no intermediary.
Such systems that require no trust into other participants however, are not
only useful for payments. The underlying Blockchain technology started to
be used in a variety of use cases, and new business models with no middlemen
involved are being tested. Blockchain technology gave an impulse to research
for new consensus algorithms, aimed to both public and private systems. It
allowed then to integrate Smartcontracts [7, 8] into its architecture, giving
life to decentralized programmable networks [15, 17] capable of running de-
centralized applications. The innovating impact of this new decentralization
paradigm is broadly recognized. In this relatively immature stage of their life,
blockchain and related technologies are facing a series technical, social and
political challenges. Among all of them however, one main problem is how
to reach global-scale adoption by solving its scalability issues. It is known
that a blockchain network congestion almost certainly results into higher
transaction fees and confirmation time delays. While it can be a temporary
problem for normal users willing to transfer funds, it may be prohibitive to
realize decentralized applications for real-world businesses. Often, they have
a transaction cost upper bound, and should always guarantee operativity.
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Aims of this Thesis
A blockchain is a public, immutable and ordered distributed ledger. This
features allow to realize a wide range of applications. A specific case-study
decentralized application will be realized. Given an information, and an
event related to it which must be unique in time, the problem is to encode
them and certify their authenticity on-demand on the blockchain. Such a
decentralized application, must satisfy several requirements related to trust,
transaction cost and confirmation delays. At any point in the history in-
deed, anyone must be able to verify a certificate authenticity, and no trusted
party should be needed in order to do it. For real-world businesses, another
problem is given by transactional cost upper bound and time after which a
certificate is confirmed by the network consensus. In order to understand (i)
in which degree such requirements can be achieved and how to realize such a
decentralized application, (ii) how to interpret the outcomes and (iii) what is
the likeliness that emerged problems will be solved, this thesis is structured
as follows.
Bitcoin is the first blockchain protocol that with its consensus algorithm,
reaches a relaxed form of consistency on pure peer-to-peer networks. It will
be seen what kind of improvements it introduces as a distributed system.
Prior Byzantine Fault Tolerant agreement algorithms instead, often relied
on synchrony assumptions in order to achieve desired properties. The Bit-
coin Protocol contribution to the problem of reaching fully asynchronous
distributed consensus will be discussed in Chapter 1.
Since distributed ledgers are in some degree a modular technology, a
blockchain protocol generalization will be viewed. It is then required to un-
derstand what kind of properties these protocols should have in order to be
secure. Then, how these properties can be achieved and if simultaneously.
Decentralized distributed ledgers introduce indeed new challenges that Chap-
ter 2 will discuss. Particularly, the above mentioned scalability problem will
be reviewed.
Just like blockchains exist on top of peer-to-peer networks, a blockchain
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protocol allowed in turn to enforce other technologies on top of it. Smartcon-
tracts are used to define higher level concepts like Decentralized Applications
and Decentralized Autonomous Organizations. Chapter 3 will introduce the
fundamentals of the Decentralization Paradigm, and the specific Ethereum
implementation of this vision.
The above principles allow to implement decentralized applications like
the one that will be described in this thesis. Today, multiple platforms
providing these functionalities exist. Some of them are in a too early stage
of their development, while others are suitable only for some problem types
and not for others. The problem of issuing blockchain certificates will be
defined, then we will try to understand what is the best platform to solve
it, currently. Chapter 4 will provide a decentralized business logic definition,
and a way to actually interact with it. The goal is to analyze in which degree
our requirements of trust, operational cost and confirmation time are satisfied
simultaneously. Then, what current architectural challenges are limiting our
possibilities and why.
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Chapter 1
Asynchronous Distributed
Systems
A ledger is a book in which accounts or events are recorded. Historically,
ledgers are used to reach consensus about facts such as ownership, identities,
authority and status. A common agreement about facts, how and when
they change should be reached. Most types of services available nowadays
require to interact with an entity that must be trusted, which is often an
intermediary actor that keeps its own ledger about users and their related
data. It is well known today that sets of data generated by this middlemen
are highly valuable, which of course led to an increase of data driven business
models. To trust such a centralized entity implies to rely on its integrity, on
its ability to handle attacks and to have confidence in the certainty of its
future operativity. Last but not least, implies a position of vulnerability
for the user. Alternately, building a system that behaves in a trustworthy
manner without knowing any of its participants, has always been a problem,
and a particular instance of this problem is given by digital currencies. As for
physical mediums of exchange, digital currencies have to face the problem of
being counterfeited. But while a physical object cannot be in multiple places
at once, digital coins must additionally solve the double-spending problem,
3
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where an actor is able to make multiple transactions using the same digital
currency unit. For a digital currency that is backed by a national currency,
the problem is solved by a centralized Financial Institution. Also known
as Clearing House, it stands between participants and validates transactions
according to its own rules, beside making sure that the system works properly.
The idea of a digital currency that reaches decentralized global consensus
about the order of transactions, was around since decades but without any
concrete solution. As we know, this was until 2009, when in an attempt to
create such an electronic payment system, the first so called crypto-currency
was born, known as Bitcoin [2]. The pseudo-anonymous owner of a Bitcoin
is able to transfer it to the next, by signing previous output transactions
which belongs to him, through asymmetric cryptography and trusting no
one. After being validated by the network, the receiver is then able to unlock
the content of the incoming transaction. When the receiver wants, he spends
it by performing the same operations the sender did. New coins are produced
through computational efforts made by the peer-to-peer network nodes. But
these concepts had already been considered before:
• electronic cash problems such as accountability and anonymity have
already been discussed previously [3], resulting into new cryptographic
tools proposals;
• the concept of money creation through computationally challenging
problem solving was proposed before Bitcoin too [5, 6] (using hashcash
mechanism, initially designed to limit email spam and denial of service
attacks [4]).
All this ideas however were still based on the principle that transactions
must be timestamped by trusted servers to keep them ordered. What makes
Bitcoin an applicable in practice innovation, allowing to interact with its sys-
tem in a trustless manner, is the introduction of a computing power based
writing permission. This ability to write refers to a distributed ledger of
ordered blocks of transactions, instead of a list of ordered transactions. Net-
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work participants are allowed to disagree about the most recent blocks of
transactions, but they will always agree on the same unique chain structure.
Since it can be viewed as an append-only chain of blocks, this data structure
is called blockchain. The blockchain is continuously expanding according
to its most computationally expensive version, which is the basis the Bit-
coin’s decentralized consensus protocol. Without any centralized component
indeed, the protocol allows all the nodes in the network to agree on a unique
event order. The main goal of this chapter is to understand the principles of
the blockchain technology, and how it places itself as a distributed system.
Blockchains are mainly a combination of the following science fields:
1. Distributed Systems ;
2. Cryptography ;
3. Game Theory.
Primary role of cryptographic primitives is to secure transaction ownership
and ledger safety. Elements of game theory and behavioral economics as-
sumptions are crucial when designing consensus algorithms. Decentralization
technologies became also objects of study from a juridical, economic and po-
litical points of view. While some of these aspects will be covered, none of
them are the argument of this work. Decentralized ledger technologies will be
mainly discussed in this chapter, as well as in the entire thesis, as distributed
and peer-to-peer systems.
1.1 Distributed Systems
This section provides basic concepts about distributed systems, to better
understand how the blockchain introduces itself as a technology. A dis-
tributed system is a network consisting of autonomous components, that
process local knowledge to achieve global goals. Different resources and ca-
pabilities are shared among nodes, to provide each user with a coherent
network that behaves, as much as possible, as a single system.
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Adopting the terminology seen in [9], when considering a distributed sys-
tem, assumptions are to be made about several crucial factors:
1. timing model, which is formed by the timing events in a distributed
system, can be distinguished as:
• synchronous, meaning that components perform simultaneous, well
organized computational steps, there is a precise time lower and
upper bound for events to occur;
• asynchronous, where distinct components perform computational
steps in an arbitrary order, with a message based progress and no
timing guarantees, with high levels of uncertainty;
• partially synchronous, the lower and the upper bounds exist like
in the asynchronous model, but they are unknown, therefore un-
usable as parameters.
2. inter-process communication, specifies the communication type between
nodes, that can be message-based or by accessing a shared memory;
3. failure model, which is the expected class of unintentional errors or
malicious behavior conducted by the nodes;
4. addressed problem, the class of problems which the system or the pro-
tocol tries to solve.
The asynchronous model has no global clock, and its nodes are expected
to make local decisions, based on external messages and internal computa-
tions. It captures indeed environments like public Internet, where an event
may occur with an arbitrary delay or never. Partially synchronous mod-
els are often used to implement real world applications, but their latency
assumptions might be violated. Synchronous models on the other side, are
mainly useful for integrated circuits and theoretical environments, where rea-
soning on technical feasibility algorithms is required. The most sever type
of failure model is given by asynchronous public networks, where a node or
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a group of nodes may behave arbitrarily (1.1.2), enter or leave the system
whenever they want. The failure model is also defined by the software and
hardware specifics the nodes have in common. The problems addressed by
a distributed system might be communication, resource allocation systems,
service providers, consensus problems and so on.
1.1.1 Consistency, Availability and Partition Tolerance
When designing web services for asynchronous distributed systems, the
following properties are often required:
• consistency, (also referred as safety or atomicity) guarantees that all
operations made in the system are totally ordered, or, in other words,
the distributed shared memory of the network is asked to respond one
request at a time, as if it were a single local machine memory;
• availability, (also referred as liveness) ensures that every request made
to the system must terminate, it means that if received by a healthy
node, must result in a response to the client;
• partition tolerance, the network is allowed to lose an arbitrary num-
ber of messages from one node to another.
The described properties however, cannot be achieved all three in the same
asynchronous network. It has been firstly stated as a conjecture by Eric
Brewer, in 1998, which resulted later into the CAP Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (CAP Theorem). A distributed system cannot have Consistency,
Availability and Partition Tolerance simultaneously.
A formal proof has been later provided [1], which shows that it is only
possible to achieve two out of these three properties. While the partition
tolerance is a binary property, meaning that it can be only allowed to lose
messages or not, consistency and availability are measurable in a spectrum.
Therefore, assuming that the network has no partitions, it is possible to
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provide full consistency and availability. Otherwise, it is only possible to
have a trade-off between them.
1.1.1.1 Distributed Consensus Algorithms
The previously discussed consistency property is achieved by consensus
algorithms. Consensus algorithms allow network nodes to share the same
memory state, even if a subset of its participants are faulty processes. An
ideal consensus mechanism possess the following characteristics:
1. termination, correctly working nodes always terminate their execution
of the consensus protocol;
2. agreement, correctly working nodes make decision based on the same
values;
3. fault toleration, the algorithm continues to operate even in presence of
malicious or broken nodes;
4. validity, values agreed by nodes are the same as the ones initially pro-
posed by at least one correct node;
5. integrity, correctly working nodes take a decision once, in a single de-
cision cycle.
The way these challenges have been addressed will be discussed below.
1.1.2 Byzantine Generals Problem
In the field of agreement protocols, a well known problem is the Byzantine
Generals Problem (BGP). To better explain it, the author tells a scenario
where distinct divisions of the Byzantine Army surround an enemy city [10].
Each general in charge of its own division, after observing the city, commu-
nicates to other generals his own decision to attack or retreat. The problem
is that some of these generals might be traitors, sending then wrong or even
incoherent messages to each of other generals. In order to have a system
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with reliable outputs, the following goals must be achieved: the group of
loyal generals must agree on the same plan, attack or retreat; and the group
of traitors shouldn’t be able to induce loyalists to make bad decisions. If v(i)
is the information communicated by the ith general, these two conditions
have to be verified in order to achieve the goals:
1. every loyal general must have the same information {v(1), ..., v(n)};
2. if the ith general is loyal, the information he sends must be used by
every loyal general as v(i).
Since both conditions are focused on a single event v(i), the problem can be
reduced as follows. Instead of having n generals, it can be viewed as a single
commanding general and its n− 1 lieutenants.
Problem 1 (Byzantine Generals Problem). A commanding general must
send an order to his n− 1 lieutenant generals such that:
1. All loyal lieutenants obey the same order;
2. If the commanding general is loyal, then every loyal lieutenant obeys
the order he sends.
Withing this metaphor, loyal generals and lieutenants are correct pro-
cesses, the orders they send and receive are messages, traitors are faulty
processes (whether malicious or unintentional). In a reliable system, in order
to make a set of processes generate the same valid output, first of all it is
necessary to provide all of them the same input. So the commander gen-
eral is the input generator, while lieutenants are the processes that should
elaborate the same input. Hopefully, none of them are faulty. Every voting
system should first of all resolve the BGP.
Oral messages By assuming that generals and lieutenants communicate
through oral messages, the following conditions are implied:
(A1) every sent message is guaranteed to be delivered correctly;
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(A2) a message receiver always knows who sent it (meaning that the nodes
form a fully connected network with unbreakable links);
(A3) the absence of a message is always detectable (the system is syn-
chronous).
The initial problem can be solved by recursively assigning each general the
commander role, while treating the others as lieutenants. Under these con-
ditions, it has been shown that a solution exists only if n > 3m + 1, where
n is the number of nodes and m of them are faulty. Obviously, the above
assumptions are too strong for a realistic distributed system.
Signed messages Oral messages allow a traitor to lie about the decision he
was told previously. But let’s take in consideration an additional assumption,
by introducing signed messages:
(A4) 1. a loyal general signature cannot be falsified, and any alteration of
his message can be detected;
2. anyone can verify the authenticity of the general’s signature.
If signed messages are introduced, a traitor can be easily detected, because
his signature can be found on signed contradictory statements about v(i).
It has been shown that the solution in the case of signed messages, solves
the problem for any number of traitors up to m, where m should be already
known. Both solutions can be modified to have more relaxed assumptions
about node connectivity, but they still operate in synchronous environments.
Asynchronous model When considering real world networks, the follow-
ing considerations have to be made about the previous constraints:
(A1) correct message delivery guarantee is not achievable, but a missing
message can also be viewed as one of the m traitor processes;
(A2) knowing the sender is already achieved with (A4);
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(A3) detecting the absence of a message isn’t achievable, it can be simulated
via time-out, which in turn requires the following assumptions:
1. there is a minimum time for message generation and transmission,
which is doable;
2. sender and receiver have synchronized clocks with a fixed maxi-
mum error, which is a problem of the same degree of difficulty as
BGP [11];
(A4) 1. complete unforgeability of the general’s message is not achievable,
but the probability of a signature to be falsified can be reduced as
much as needed;
2. message authenticity verification is completely achievable.
The above solution clearly doesn’t fit asynchronous models. The most severe
scenario is an asynchronous public network with arbitrary message delays,
with no global clock and no preliminary knowledge about participants. It has
been proved that no fully asynchronous consensus protocol can tolerate even
a single unannounced process fault [12]. Even worse, the conclusion is made
upon the assumption that the message system is completely reliable, which
means that a message is always delivered and exactly once (with no time-out
or order guarantee). It is clearly stated however, that the result doesn’t show
a practical solution impossibility. The asynchronous model rather requires
more realistic assumptions and more relaxed requirements, resulting into new
distributed computing models. Data consistency in distributed databases
are affected by this conclusions, too. For example, a set of processes that
participated in some transaction processing, should agree whether to commit
the transaction result or not. All involved processes must agree on the final
decision, in a fully asynchronous environment with no central component.
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1.1.3 Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
It has been seen that a Byzantine Fault (BF) can be caused by uninten-
tional malfunctions, or by a malevolent intelligence which tries to subvert
the system. Byzantine Faults induce a subset of nodes to produce inconsis-
tent outputs with arbitrarily long delays up to the infinite. Such events may
harm the consistency requirement of a distributed system. BFs are expected
to become more and more frequent with time, since software becomes more
complex and malicious attacks bring higher reward if successful. A process
is stateful if it is able to remember previous events, the information actually
stored in its memory defines its state. State replication algorithms are used
to implement resilient to BFs distributed systems. The property of a system
to correctly survive a certain amount of BFs is referred as Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (BFT).
The first attempt to introduce a state-machine replication protocol in
a real-world like asynchronous model, has been proposed as Practical BFT
(PBFT) [13]. The protocol allows to implement a deterministic service with
a state and its operations, which allow to perform arbitrarily complex com-
putations. Components within this model are connected by a network that
may fail to deliver messages, delay them, duplicate or change their order. It
is also assumed that nodes have distinct implementations of the same soft-
ware and different administrators. Collision resistant hash functions are used
to prevent message corruption, and each message digest is signed through
public-key cryptography and attached to plain text. It is required that all
replicas are aware of others’ public-key. The adversary is assumed to be
powerful enough to manipulate groups of faulty nodes, delay messages and
correct nodes, but not forever.
The PBFT algorithm provides consistency in a fully asynchronous model.
All client requests are totally ordered. The algorithm requires the same start
state for all replicas, and a maximum number of allowed faulty nodes f . It
operates according to the following principles:
• there is a set of replicas R = {r0, ..., rn−1} in the network;
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• each replica ri ∈ R is part of a view, such that:
– each view has a primary replica, the others are backups ;
– replicas in the view have a index v, the primary replica has index
p = v mod n;
– if the primary replica appears to be faulty, the view changes.
• the state of ri is modified according to the following protocol:
1. the client c make an operation request to primary;
2. the primary assigns a sequential number to the request and broad-
casts it (pre-prepare messages);
3. if ri accepts this number, it multicasts the event (prepare mes-
sages), offering to replicas the possibility to agree on total order-
ing;
4. if ri receives 2f prepare-messages, it multicasts the commit mes-
sage, meaning that replicas agreed on total ordering;
5. if ri receives 2f + 1 commit-messages, request is placed in queue
to be executed;
6. each non-faulty ri sends the result directly to c.
• c accepts the result when at least f + 1 replies are identical.
It is proved that such an approach guarantees asynchronous consistency,
usable in real-world applications. However, it happens if less than f = n−1
3
exhibit BF. The requirement to have 3f + 1 replicas is indeed expensive.
Synchrony assumptions are still required to achieve availability. In the case
that the primary is faulty, c sets a time-out when making a request. If the
time-out expires and there is no response, c will broadcast the same request to
all replicas. After that, a change-view operation will be required as described
in the protocol. Other important problems are related to message overhead
and system scalability. A series of PBFT-like algorithms have been proposed
through time, but they still require various forms of weak synchrony.
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1.2 The Bitcoin Protocol
In public networks, an arbitrary number of participants might be spawned
by an attacker to induce the system to behave incorrectly. Bitcoin behaves
correctly as long as the majority of network computing power is offered by
honest nodes. Next, in order to show why Bitcoin is reliable enough for
financial transactions in such a severe environment, its consensus principles
are provided. However, for a deeper view of the Bitcoin implementation, and
how to actually use it, which is not the goal of this thesis, the reader can refer
to [16]. In order to reach global ledger consensus, Bitcoin nodes perform the
following independent, local steps:
1. transaction verification, performed by every node according to a well
defined set of rules;
2. transaction aggregation into a new block and Proof of Work computa-
tion, performed by miner nodes ;
3. candidate block verification, and their concatenation to the blockchain;
4. block selection, based on the highest cumulative Proof of Work chain
version.
Each mentioned local step will be described, in order to see if and how
termination; consensus agreement; fault tolerance; validity and integrity have
been achieved.
1.2.1 Transaction Verification
The process of changing a fact in a ledger is called transaction. A common
agreement about facts, how and when they change, should be reached. In
double-entry bookkeeping, transactions are recorded in the ledger with input
and output parameters. A basic Bitcoin transaction is a record that encode
value transfer from a user to another. Each transaction is a new entry in this
public, double-entry ledger which underlies Bitcoin. Transaction outputs are
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amounts of BTC1, recorded on the ledger and confirmed by the network. An
unspent transaction output is called UTXO, and it is defined by:
• currency amount in its smallest unit, called satoshi ;
• a locking script, or cryptographic puzzle, that a user must satisfy in
order to spend the amount.
The script is written in the Bitcoin’s stateless, stack-based scripting language
called Script. A transaction input instead is made up of:
• one ore more UTXOs that the user is spending;
• a unlocking script which satisfies the above mentioned locking script.
Transaction inputs, are defined by which UTXO will be used and the user
ownership proof. Every transaction is a Bitcoin state-machine transition.
The Bitcoin state is defined by the UTXO set, which is the current amount of
the UTXOs on the ledger. Suppose that Bob has 10 BTC and he sends 2 of them
to Alice. This action will generate two transaction outputs: the amount sent
to Alice (2 BTC) and the remaining amount sent back to himself. A wallet
contains a collection of UTXOs that the user is able to unlock and spend. If
a user makes a transaction through his wallet, it is then broadcasted on the
network. Other nodes receive the transaction. But before propagating it
again to its neighbors, they will first verify if the transaction is valid. The
verification proceeds according to a strict set of rules which include, but is
not limited to:
• transaction syntax and data structure correctness;
• transaction semantic properties, like input and output non emptiness,
sum of inputs shouldn’t be lower than output value, etc...;
• size in bytes smaller or equal to a parametric value (currently, 100byte);
1BTC will be used when referring to Bitcoin as a currency unit, Bitcoin will be used
when referring to the protocol itself.
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• locking and unlocking scripts related constraints;
• transaction fee verification.
If a transaction doesn’t match all the requirements, it will not be propagated
on the network. Otherwise, every node will receive it asynchronously. At
this point however, a transaction is still unconfirmed. Each node maintains a
set of received unconfirmed transactions called transaction pool or mempool.
1.2.2 Block Creation and Mining
Bitcoin network is a collection of peer-to peer nodes running the protocol
on top of the internet. There are no hierarchies and each node runs sev-
eral modular functions. One of these functions is called mining, and it is
what allows to reach network consensus without a central authority. Valid
transactions from local mempool are selected by miner nodes. This limited
amount of transactions are then timestamped, by being putt in the same
block. Each miner wants his block to be the next one attached to the chain
of blocks that they have locally: the blockchain. This is what differentiates
miners from other nodes, they propose candidate blocks to be appended next
to the ledger.
Roughly, a block creation can be described as follows. After an empty
block is created, a special coinbase transaction is added to it (which will be
discussed in 1.2.4), this transaction doesn’t require an UTXO. After that, a
selected set of mempool transactions are added. On the blockchain, each
block will contain the summary of all the transaction contained in, in or-
der to efficiently prove that a given transaction txi has been included. For
this purpose, binary hash trees are used (or merkle trees). A merkle tree
is built by hashing each leaf txi, and by recursively hashing pairs of nodes
(hxn/2y, hxn/2+1y), until a merkle root hash is obtained. Anyone will be able
to verify if txi is included in the block in O(log n).
In order to have a winner candidate block, miners start a computationally
expensive race between them, which consists into solving a mathematical
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problem through iterative input trials. The solution to this problem is called
Proof of Work (PoW), which is a hashcash based [4] mechanism. It is difficult
to produce but easy for others to verify that the miner spent resources for.
This is a round-like competition and each round length should be constant
over years and decades. Therefore, PoW difficulty is dynamically adjustable
by the system, in order to face the constantly improving hardware used by
miners. The difficulty is given by the probability to obtain a solution, which
is calculable prior to a range of consecutive rounds. The block header is filled
by a miner with the following information:
1. protocol version that the node is running;
2. previous block hash (again, according to the local version of the ledger);
3. block creation timestamp;
4. merkle root hash;
5. target, which encodes the difficulty to find a solution;
6. nonce.
Roughly, the nonce is the input variation which allowed the miner to find
the solution to the problem. Once the miner obtains the PoW after a solving
session, he attaches it to the block and broadcasts it.
1.2.3 Block Verification and Consensus
If a miner is still solving the given problem, but receives from the net-
work someone else’s block that satisfies the difficulty target, he immediately
stops. The miner knows he lost at this round. Beside starting to prepare
transactions for the next round, a local validation of the received candidate
block occurs. Similarly to a transaction verification, a node propagates it
only if the candidate block satisfies several conditions. Blocks must have
valid syntax, they must satisfy the difficulty target all included transactions
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must be valid, and so on. Dishonest miners proposals are rejected, and they
lose both the possibility to modify the ledger and their computational efforts.
It is still possible that several nodes may obtain a PoW a the same time,
and all of them will be broadcasted. At this point, more nodes will surely
start to disagree about the most recent blockchain history. Ledger copies
aren’t consistent because newly mined blocks arrive at different moments to
each peer. Different versions of the blockchain are called forks. However,
inconsistencies are temporary: each node will always prefer the blockchain
version with the highest cumulative Proof of Work. Even if more than one
node mined a block in a given round, some solutions are always harder to find
than others. This is also know as the longest chain. In other words, given a
round R, the winner block will always be the one with most expensive PoW.
1.2.4 Incentive and Network Attacks
It has not yet been said why someone should spend resources, trying to
have the right to append a block to the chain. Mining is also a process of
creation of new satoshi units. Miners receive reward in terms of BTC in two
ways, they are indeed rewarded with:
1. new coins created with each new block, the amount produced will de-
crease over time down to 0, due to the deflationary nature of Bitcoin;
2. fees from all the transactions included in that block, approximately in
year 2140 this will be the only miner reward system.
The first type of reward is given to the miner through the previously men-
tioned coinbase transaction. A coinbase transaction is always the first to
be included. It doesn’t consume any UTXO and creates BTC from nothing.
Coinbase transaction output is the miners’ address.
1.2.4.1 Attacking Bitcoin
The above summarized reward system stimulate nodes to participate, but
its purpose isn’t limited to that. The network is public with high levels of
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Figure 1.1: Block structure and Proof of Work correctness, miners actively search
a nonce such that the block header satisfies shown conditions.
uncertainty, and consensus participants could be unknown entities. The PoW
algorithm makes it more convenient for them to work according to the rules,
instead of working against the protocol. Bitcoin and Bitcoin-like theoretical
models are secure with adversary hash power strictly lower than 1/2 (in a
byzantine-style notation, correct nodes should be more than 2f + 1, where f
is the computational power held by bad actors). Hash power requirements
have been shown to be lower only in case that the adversary has the ability
to delay messages for an arbitrarily long amount of time [30] (even infinite).
With unbounded network delays consistency and chain-quality (blockchain
protocol security properties 2.1.1) cannot be achieved.
An emerged problem is that a minority pool of miners could be incen-
tivized to delay their own messages. Bitcoin is designed to reward miners
in proportion of the overall computing power they control. A theoretically
feasible strategy has been described that could help a mining minority group
to obtain more reward than its power share [32]. This selfish miners, in other
words, could keep private their version of chain if it is longer than the pub-
licly shared one. After several rounds selfish miners will publish the whole
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chain they kept privately, forcing honest miners to adopt it. Selfish miners
will be able to claim all the coinbase and fees rewards, while others will have
wasted their efforts. The proposed solution however, ensures that groups of
miners with a smaller power share than 1/4 cannot engage this strategy. To
easily detect selfish pools then, at least 2/3 of the network mining power
must be owned by honest nodes.
1.3 Achievements in Asynchronous Systems
Upon a public asynchronous environment like Internet, Bitcoin Protocol
[2, 16] prevents double-spending in a decentralized manner. All the nodes
are aware that a transaction occurred and a coin is spent, being part of a
confirmed block. All the following transactions of the same coin, made by
the same user, will be rejected. Bitcoin doesn’t contradict CAP Theorem
1, but manages to achieve all three properties in practical and probabilistic
manner. A relaxed consistency assumption which fits asynchronous envi-
ronments is introduced. Consistency isn’t obtained immediately. There is
a strong probabilistic guarantee that nodes will reach consensus in near fu-
ture instead, while currently having both partition tolerance and availability.
Academic efforts have shown that Bitcoin do achieve these properties both
in formal synchronous and asynchronous environments [14, 30, 31]. These
achievements rely on practically hard to break assumptions related to ad-
versary computing power; arbitrary message delay possibilities or malicious
alliances by groups of miners.
On the top of the Internet multiple protocols with different blockchains
may exist, where the definition of a transaction and the architecture of the
blockchain itself may vary. Therefore, each blockchain may have a different
use case and digital currencies such as Bitcoin are only one of them. The
previously introduced trust problem is solved by decentralized consensus,
introducing the so called trustless trust architecture. Some might argue that
this is a misname, and that it is actually a distributed trust among nodes,
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or even a system trust. However what is important is that a blockchain
user is now allowed not to know any of other participants, expecting the
right outputs or the wanted service, with no intermediaries. Other promising
features of this new paradigm are:
• configurable transaction transparency;
• ledger immutability;
• service availability;
• security;
• decentralization.
Alternative Consensus Models Bitcoin is based on the consensus algo-
rithm called Proof of Work. After PoW however, other consensus models
have been proposed and implemented in order to deal with public asyn-
chronous networks. For example, in the Proof of Stake consensus model, the
idea is that the rights to write on the ledger are given not by the author’s
computing power proportion, but in terms of his stake in the system. The
principle is that the more an actor has invested in the network, the less he
will want to break the rules. Some versions require that in case of bad behav-
ior, the actor loses at least a part of its stake. One main advantage of PoS is
that it doesn’t consume energy. In Proof of Work the barriers to be enabled
as a miner is given by the mining difficulty, while in PoS the barriers are
given by the price of stake units. However, less reseach have been made in
terms of PoS. Other consensus models are implemented in blockchain public
systems, however, their full coverage is out of scope of this work.

Chapter 2
Blockchain and Distributed
Ledgers
Bitcoin is the first specific implementation of a blockchain protocol. As
a paradigm, this type of decentralization is already proving to be useful in
different kinds of real world applications, not only financial transactions.
When designing a blockchain, different use cases would require to enforce
some paradigm properties, while not focusing so much on others. The advent
of blockchain on public asynchronous networks however, has stimulated ad-
ditional research efforts in permissioned consensus protocols, too. While the
term blockchain refers indeed to permissionless distributed systems, where
anyone can join and leave, Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT) refers to
permissioned systems. In a distributed system with a permissioned consensus
algorithm, the transaction validator is an already trusted entity or a group
of. In this thesis the main focus is on permissionless ledgers.
First, it will be seen how blockchains have been formalized as a concept,
in order to understand its properties and possible architectural trade-offs.
This chapter is going to be a summary of the main features and challenges
that a blockchain architecture introduces.
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2.1 Blockchain
Blockchain protocols work upon a relaxed form of consensus mechanism,
called T-consistency. It requires that correct nodes agree on the chain struc-
ture, except for a potentially small amount T of the latest added blocks.
Usually, these T blocks are called unconfirmed. T -consistency is the most ap-
propriate form of consistency for blockchain protocols, with arbitrary message
delays. However, when a block becomes confirmed, its placement on the chain
will be permanent for all the nodes. Only the confirmed part of a blockchain
is actually a chain, but from a global point of view, the unconfirmed part is
a tree-like structure. In this section an already existing blockchain protocol
definition [30] will be shown briefly, to understand how it would look like
more formally. The minimal set of properties of a secure blockchain will be
then provided. Each block can be defined as a triple (h−1, η,m), where:
• h−1 represents a pointer to the previous block;
• m is the record component of the block;
• η a Proof of Work is derived both from m and h−1.
This is in fact an abstract view of the block header described in 1.2, and the
blockchain protocol itself is defined as in 1.
Definition 1 (Blockchain Protocol). A blockchain protocol is a pair of algo-
rithms (ΠV , C), such that:
• Π is a stateful algorithm that maintains a local state, receives a security
parameter κ as input;
• C(κ, state) outputs −→m, an ordered sequence of records m, that is the
record chain;
• V (−→m) = 1 ⇐⇒ −→m is valid, where V is a validity predicate that has a
semantic definition;
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The Bitcoin specific protocol is parametrized by an adjustable mining
hardness parameter p, which defines the target Dp = p(κ) ∗ 2κ. A block can
be proposed as candidate if, for a given η, H(h−1, η,m) < Dp. H is a hash
function and, as we have seen, its output should be less than the target. The
record chain −→m is another way to say blockchain, and the validity predicate V
might be the semantic definition of no double spending. (ΠV , C) blockchain
protocol execution is determined by the joint view of all parties, denoted
by EXEC(Π
V ,C)(A,Z, k). Z is an execution environment which activates a
number of participants as either correct or corrupted. A is the attacker that
controls corrupted parties and sets the messages that they send.
2.1.1 Security Properties
It has been already said that PoW based protocols allow to achieve a
certain level of consistency. However, T -consistency is insufficient to provide
a secure blockchain [30]. A blockchain, in order to be secure, must have the
following properties:
1. the already mentioned T -consistency, which means that extremely high
probability, at any point, the chains of two correct nodes can differ only
within the most recent T blocks;
2. future self-consistence, at any two time points r, s, with an extremely
high probability, the chains of two correct nodes can differ only within
the most recent T blocks;
3. g-chain-growth, at any point of the execution and with extremely high
probability, correct node chains grow by at least T blocks in the last T
g
rounds, where g is the chain-growth rate;
4. µ-chain-quality, at any point of the execution, for any T consecutive
blocks and for any correct node chain, with an extremely high prob-
ability, the fraction of blocks attached by honest players is at least
µ.
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Figure 2.1: Blockchain Technology Stack.
The chain quality property ensures that the number of blocks attachable
by A is proportional to its computational power. Chain growth guarantees
that the chain grows proportionally with the number of rounds in a pro-
tocol. Future self-consistency is required in order to exclude such protocols
that, for example, oscillates between two chains −→m1 and −→m2 on odd and even
rounds. Authors show that with Bitcoin protocol all these properties have
been achieved, under some value of mining hardness p, if message delays are
∆-bounded. Higher is ∆, higher is the probability of chain forks. Meaning
that if messages circulate less, than it is more likely that nodes will have
their own version of facts for a greater amount of time. Malicious behav-
ior like selfish mining is possible with unbounded message delays 1.2.4. It
has been shown too that with unbounded delays it is not required to own
more than 1/2 computing power to attack the network. All of these four
properties have been proved necessary to achieve consensus which simulta-
neously satisfies both persistency and availability. Persistency is the ability
of a ledger to never suffer from an already added record deletion. While the
already mentioned availability property guarantees that a network response
is always provided.
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2.2 Decentralized Systems
A system where its components process local data in order to receive
global goals, has been defined as distributed in Section 1.1. The term decen-
tralized instead, has grown in popularity since the advent of blockchain. It
is often used to indicate that blockchain protocols are able to disjoint mono-
lithic organizations into multiple independent entities that perform the same
task. Both decentralization and distribution are often used as interchange-
able concepts, but this habit is incompatible with arguments treated in this
thesis. This section provides an attempt to make a distinction between them,
and to define decentralization as for how it will be further used.
The first known time that terms decentralized and distributed have been
used to express distinct concepts, while discussing network survivability, was
in [34]. Roughly, a decentralized network has been defined as a hierarchi-
cal structure that is a mixture of a centralized network and a distributed
system (Figure 2.2). By attacking the small number of nodes on top of the
hierarchy all the system might result unavailable. The distributed version of
the network is viewed as an ideal state of information and communication
redundancy, with an optimal survivability in case of physical attacks.
In today’s blockchain paradigm however, a distributed system can still
be described as centralized. It is necessary to distinguish the centralization-
decentralization spectrum upon multiple dimensions. A system can be de-
centralized1:
• architecturally, depending both by:
a. the number of physical subsystems which is made up of;
b. the degree to which the system is able to tolerate a subset of its
components being down;
• logically, if the system does not require a single-state definition, and
1The Meaning of Decentralization (https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/
the-meaning-of-decentralization-a0c92b76a274).
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Figure 2.2: Centralized, Decentralized and Distributed according to [34].
acts independently, in the same manner, if divided in N parts;
• politically, depending on how many organizations are able exert a form
of control over its components.
Bitcoin is architecturally decentralized, because it relies on multiple peers
and there is no software or hardware single point of failure. Distributed
systems are in fact architecturally decentralized. Bitcoin is also politically
decentralized, since no single entity controls it, and anyone can join the
network as a node. However, Bitcoin is logically centralized, because all the
nodes have to agree on a unique state of the data structures.
A system can be more or less (de)centralized upon the above mentioned
dimensions. An objective scale to measure the decentralization parameter
of a system, would allow to compare multiple systems and to observe how
much a system modification impacts on it. In an attempt to quantify decen-
tralization the Nakamoto Coefficient [25] has been proposed. It is a Social
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Network Analysis style measurement that could potentially give a pretty ac-
curate view of a system centralization status. Given a system S, the method
proposed in [25] requires to:
1. decompose S into a set of its relevant subsystems S = {sub0, ..., subn−1};
2. for each subj, determine p1 > p2 > ... > p|subj | such that
∑|subj |
i=1 pi = 1,
pi is the power proportion of an actor i in the given subsystem;
3. for each subj, determine a power threshold thj that no single entity
should control in order to compromise subj;
4. for each subj, calculate the minimum number of its entities whose power
proportions reach thj;
Nsubj := min{k ∈ [1, ..., |subj|] :
∑k
i=1 pi ≥ thresholdj}
5. the Nakamoto Coefficient of S will be
Nmin := min{Nsub0 , ..., Nsubn−1}
Nakamoto coefficient is the minimum number of actors necessary to cor-
rupt in order to compromise a subsystem, and consequently the entire system.
What nakamoto coefficient is saying is that a system is centralized as much
as its most centralized subsystem subj. The main challenge introduced by
this proposal however, consists into finding the right subsystems of S to an-
alyze and its power thresholds. Especially when political decentralization is
considered. For example, in a public blockchain the following subsystems
might be detected:
• mining subsystem, governed by miners;
• repository committing power, induced by developers;
• client software subsystem;
• geopolitical subsystem, defined by geographic location of nodes;
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• ownership, which describes the distribution of currency units among
users;
• exchanges, or how many of them have relevant trade volume.
It is already clear why mining must be decentralized, where thmining = 0.51.
Distribution of commits is also important: as [26] points out, a blockchain
project survivability is correlated with the amount of active committing de-
velopers. Developers shouldn’t also belong to a single organization. Geo-
graphic location of nodes should be distributed, too. For example, a large
amount of Bitcoin mining power is located in China. Some political decisions
made by a country could harm system stability, if geographically centralized
on its territory. Too much currency units (or any type of asset) controlled
by a single entity could harm its decentralization. Despite not being part
of the protocol, it is known that too much trading volume control exerted
by a single exchange could harm the system, too2. As an example, some
divergences are possible when talking about client software decentralization.
Bitcoin’s observed dominating mindset is to use a single main client (Bitcoin
Core), upon which an independent number of developers work. On the other
side, Ethereum (Section 3.2) actively promotes multiple client implementa-
tions in different languages (C++, Python, Go, Rust, etc...)3. This feature
reminds the assumption seen in the PBFT proposal [13], which states that
nodes should have different software implementations in order to avoid the
same simultaneous fault. It can be said that political decentralization has a
big influence, and quantifying it is a highly empirical work, based on Social
Network Analysis tools.
2In 2014 Mt. Gox Bitcoin exchange was handling 70% of worldwide transactions,
before finding out that approximately 850000 BTC have been stolen over time from users.
Currently the volume share is fairly distributed among many competitors (https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Mt._Gox). Today it is also possible to trade using Decentralized
Applications (Chapter 3), with no intermediary.
3A list of Ethereum clients, proposed by distinct developer teams.http://ethdocs.
org/en/latest/ethereum-clients/choosing-a-client.html
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2.3 Decentralization, Consensus and Scale
At the time of writing this document, the Blockchain and Distributed
Ledgers are relatively immature technologies. Currently, even the most ad-
vanced protocols are still under development and have a series of issues to
be solved. The main challenges these decentralized protocols must face, are
going to be described in this section.
Usually in a blockchain protocol all the nodes share the same state, and
do process all system state transitions. The problem that emerges with this
approach however, is that while providing security, it limits scalability. A
blockchain protocol like Bitcoin cannot process more transactions per round
more than a single node can. In order to increase the system throughput
(transactions per second), one of the most common arguments would be to
increase the block size, which is the number of transactions that fits in. But
increasing the block size has a drawback in terms the above discussed de-
centralization. In this manner indeed, a network would be kept up only by
computationally powerful players. These players would become also politi-
cally influential within the system. Other practical approaches to solve the
problem bring us to the same centralization issue. The process of tuning a
blockchain protocol parameter in order to make it operate better is called
reparametrization. Intuitively, turns out that while designing a blockchain
protocol, the following trilemma has to be considered: a blockchain can have
at most two out of the three properties of decentralization, scale and security4.
A more formal way to analyze the problem have been proposed in [33],
with the above stated trilemma resulting into a theorem. In other words, a
generic peer-to-peer system S that executes an abstract blockchain protocol,
can have the following properties:
1. decentralization, guarantees that the system has no architectural sin-
gle point of failure nor political single point of decision (architectural
4Ethereum trilemma introduction (https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/
Sharding-FAQ).
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Figure 2.3: The DCS Triangle.
and political decentralization, Section 2.2);
2. consensus, network participants share the same system state, reached
by consensus algorithms (T -consistency is implied, too);
3. scale, defines the capability of the system to handle a growing workload
demand.
Scaling property of a system also implies that it is capable to satisfy the
same transaction demand of any competing system, which provides the same
service to the same set of users. The proposed theorem in [33] is intuitively
represented by the DCS Triangle shown in Figure 2.3. Only two out of the
three mentioned properties can be achieved.
Theorem 2 (DCS Theorem). Decentralized consensus systems centralize at
scale when consensus participants maintain full consensus over the entire
state of the system.
The work [33] shows why the probability of such an outcome is extremely
high. Its proof is built upon the assumption that in any sufficiently large pop-
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ulation, individual access to computational power is distributed unequally.
Another axiom is that the majority of participants do not have the required
amount of computational power and storage capacity, to elaborate messages
generated by a global scale user-base. These assumptions are empirically
true. Consensus participants are defined as independent entities who main-
tain a complete copy of the system’s state, and are part of a voting process
to update this state. Let S be a decentralized consensus system whose con-
sensus participants maintain full consensus of the system state. The same
notation as in [33] will be used to define a system operational throughput.
Definition 2 (Computational Throughput). The computational throughput
T(S) of a consensus system S refers to the rate at which the system updates
its state by processing all input messages.
A system throughput is determined mainly by the following factors:
• the size of quorum required in order to consider consensus reached;
• the computational power of each consensus participant;
• the time-out message period which has been set-up by the mechanism.
In a PoW consensus mechanism, the quorum is defined by the most com-
putationally powerful users. For example, Bitcoin has a time-out period of
10 minutes, and slow participants are likely to hit it more often then oth-
ers. T (S) is fast as much as the slowest participant within the consensus
quorum. As mentioned before, a typical way in Bitcoin to increase T (S)
would be to increase the block size (or other reparametrization solutions).
But there would be less nodes able to include more transaction in a block
within the same 10 minutes time-out.
The coordination cost C(S), is defined as the difficulty for a participant to
engage others and share the same goal. The higher is the coordination cost,
the better is for the system S. It ensures that the probability of coordinated
malicious behavior is very low. The author then, puts coordination cost
34 2. Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers
potential users
users of S
consensus
participants
Figure 2.4: Scaling user base brings transaction demand, but increasing through-
put T (S) implies that less consensus participants are able to (1) af-
ford system state maintenance and (2) enter the deciding quorum.
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into a directly proportional relation with the number of system’s consensus
participants: C(S) = |S|.
The unequal computational power distribution among population, and
the fact that most of users do not have a sufficient amount of it to maintain
a global scale consensus, leads to the following conclusions. Let c refer to
the average computational power of all participants that ever participated
in a sufficiently significant series of consensus rounds. Then T (S) exceeds
c at scale proportionally to the new users of S. The subsequent phenom-
ena is that at scale, the coordination cost C(S) for consensus participants
decreases. Low C(S) leads to the risk of coalition based behavior from con-
sensus participants. Unfortunately, single point of failure or political single
point of decision is highly probable here. It is clear that an initial decentral-
ized state of a system becomes centralized at scale. When maintaining the
full system state, a system centralize at scale.
2.4 Scalability
It is clear that the main problem blockchain protocols must face is scal-
ability, which is a factor that can make the difference between wide global
adoption or a more limited use of it. The scalability challenge consists into
finding a solution to increase the transaction throughput T (S) at scale, with-
out making it over-expensive for consensus participants and users. It has been
seen that solutions such as block size increase and block interval reduction
can be only taken as eventual preliminary steps in order to achieve a scalable
system.
2.4.1 Blockchain Sharding
A way to get around the DCS triangle and increase T (S) can be again, to
rethink the consistency property. Using again the same terminology seen in
[33], a system is DC if it focuses mainly on Decentralization and Consistency.
A global scale system can be achieved by combining multiple DC systems
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called shards. Each shard has its own group of consensus participants which
trust other groups. Again, a inter-group trust mechanism can be achieved at
system level, through various forms of transparency techniques. Obviously, a
combination of DC systems has an overall weak form of consistency. Various
challenges are introduced when high levels of inter-shard communication and
consistency is required.
There are, however, distinguishable types of sharding. The first type can
be referred as state sharding, where each shard maintains a portion of the
global state (storage). Multiple sharding-enabled systems are in development
phase, at time of writing. Ethereum (which will be seen in Chapter 3) will
eventually implement state-sharding in the future.
Another type is the computational sharding, and an example of such a
system will be briefly shown. Zilliqa platform [45] introduces the idea of
dividing the network into smaller consensus groups that process transactions
in parallel, with no overlaps. Each group is called shard. Zilliqa protocol
uses Proof of Work only for sybil-attack prevention. Consensus is instead
achieved through a PBFT-style improved algorithm (Subsection 1.1.3) with
communication complexity O(n) in the normal case, and a constant O(1)
signature size. It has indeed a two-layer blockchain structure that is out of
scope of this work.
2.4.2 State channels
A system is DS if it is designed in order to maintain Decentralization and
Scalability. Let main-chain be a DC system such as Bitcoin. A side-chain is
a DS system that allows the main-chain to increase T (S) at scale, letting it to
preserve its T -consistency. The idea is that the side-chain is used for updating
and processing transactions off the main-chain [46]. But when some desired
state is finalized, it is written to the main-chain. Both systems work together
in such a way that consensus is required less often, thus unloading time and
power-consuming operations from the main-chain. A transaction on the main
blockchain can encode a state-channel birth between two or more parties and
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another one its end, while a smartcontract (Chapter 3) can be used to enforce
the rules of participation. When a state-channel is closed and side-chain
communication ceases, the state modification induced by this interaction is
written on the main blockchain. This approach can be very useful because
(i) a few transactions are able to encode multiple transactions and (ii) it
results in a fee reduction when performing micro-payments. However, the
reduction does not occur when the fee is also a function of (a) the amount
bytes written on the blockchain and (b) the computational complexity of a
transaction. As we will deduce after reading Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, since
in Ethereum there is a block gas limit that measures (a) and (b), multiple
smartcontract deployments couldn’t be encoded within state-channels, even
if it makes sense.
2.5 Anonymity and Zero Knowledge Proofs
When designing a secure public blockchain, confidentiality questions are
also necessary to answer. It is often required to be able to chose what infor-
mation to keep private or public. A basic blockchain protocol which relies
on asymmetric cryptography provides pseudo-anonymity. Meaning that for
each transaction, the identity of the user that generated it, is tied to a public
key or address. For technical or personal reasons, the user (or its wallet)
can potentially generate as much addresses as necessary, in order to avoid
traceability from third parties. In the Bitcoin Network, however, it has been
shown that:
• it is possible to associate identities to blockchain addresses [35, 36];
• to classify both identified and unknown user’s behavior [36, 37];
• even to perform Social Network Analysis [38].
These tools might be also used as an attack vector to real identities and
miners. Attacks like network partitioning and message delaying (Subsection
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1.2.4) can be performed if coordination cost C(S) of a system S isn’t high
(Section 2.3), and especially if transactions are accessible as plain data [39,
40].
While being able to verify transaction correctness and reach system con-
sensus, it is often required the ability to hide its recipient, sender and con-
tent. Such advantages are offered by a recently proposed cryptographic tool
called zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge (zk-
SNARKs) [41], that will be briefly explained below. Let L denote a NP
language and P a program (circuit or universal function) in L. Let n be the
dimension of input instances acceptable by P . Given the input instance x
such that |x| = n, a peer s1 ∈ S broadcasts that x ∈ L. Another peer s2
receives the statement x ∈ L and he wants to know if the statement is true.
Given this peer-to-peer system within which no one knows each other, zk-
SNARK is a non-interactive and succinct proof π which proves that x ∈ L.
Non interactive because s1 and s2 never interact and they don’t know each
other, and succinct because it should be very easy to verify the statement:
• s2 is protected because he is able to verify if x ∈ L through π;
• s1 is protected because s2 is able to verify only x ∈ L, but not the
source s1 or other information.
In order to achieve such a system, it must be built as follows:
1. a trusted peer s0 takes the program P and performs an initial system
setup;
2. the system setup produces two public keys, proving key pk and verifi-
cation key vk;
3. then, an untrusted peer si uses pk to create a proof π, that proves
x ∈ L;
4. other untrusted peer will use vk to verify π, preserving full anonymity
as stated above.
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Succinctness property requires |π| to be constant, and π verification cost is
O(n). zk-SNARKs have been used in a blockchain protocol proposal known
as Zerocash [42], and later implemented as Zcash5. More practically, zk-
SNARKs are proofs that sj performed some computation over an input, but
without revealing the input. Miners then, will verify the transaction as for
Bitcoin, but without any type of knowledge about the transferred amount
and addresses. In Zcash, each user is provided with two addresses. z-addr
is a fully anonymous address and it is used in transactions as described
above. t-addr is a bitcoin-like pseudonym. Each user is able to chose what
transaction to keep fully anonymous.
The problem afflicting zk-SNARKs is the requirement to have a trusted
peer s0. Even assuming that s0 is honest, an attacker could possibly corrupt
the initial system setup. Therefore, generated keys might be corrupted too.
There is no way to mathematically verify that s0 is actually honest, and that
the sensible setup information have been destroyed after the process. For
example, a malicious party could use this information to issue new units
of currency in the system. Zero-knowledge Scalable Transparent Arguments
of Knowledge (zk-STARKs) instead [43] have been proposed as proofs that
could potentially replace zk-SNARKs, eliminating the necessity for s0. zk-
STARKs allow to have a system with at least the same features zk-SNARKs
provide, with no initial setup and in a trustless manner. Currently however,
the main drawback is that it a zk-STARK proof π is approximately 1000
times larger in size than a zk-SNARK.
2.5.1 Scalability with Proof Systems
As authors point out, zk-STARKs and other proof systems could be also
used to reduce scalability issues by exponentially decreasing transaction veri-
fication time. Some nodes could integrate a prover function, that will produce
proofs in quasi-linear time. These proofs can convince the network to accept
a current ledger state as valid, avoiding several expensive factors:
5https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/zcash/
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• to re-execute identical computations that already occurred elsewhere,
in order to achieve the same state;
• to store the entire blockchain state on each node.
2.6 Distributed Ledger Technologies
Having said that the work in this thesis covers permissionless protocols in
asynchronous networks, a brief introduction will be given about alternative
forms of distributed ledgers. In a permissionless setting like Bitcoin, any-
one is enabled to start a public node by downloading the publicly available
code. Anyone capable of, is able to validate transactions and participate
into consensus processes. Transaction are transparent but with potentially
hidden content. The main advantage of public ledgers is the ability to elimi-
nate intermediary entities, to lower or eliminate infrastructural costs through
decentralized applications.
Several ideas behind blockchains could however be used with restricted
access to a limited amount of known entities. Since these entities trust each
other and are co-interested to run the network and its protocol, there is no
need to have incentive mechanisms. These systems type are indeed coinless,
and are referred with a generic term Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs).
A type of DLT are the Federated Ledgers, consensus is maintained by a
group of pre-selected set of nodes, and the access to read can be restricted.
Private Ledgers instead, have its write permissions assigned to the entity
which created it, for internal business logic purposes.
Open source distributed ledger projects6 can also be offered as a service7.
Hyperledger Fabric is a distributed ledger framework implementation, which
that allows consensus models and internal services to be modular. Related
projects such as Hyperledger Composer instead, can be viewed as a language
to specify ledger actors, assets and logic. Since decentralization is heavily
6https://www.hyperledger.org/
7https://developer.ibm.com/blockchain/sandbox/
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sacrificed in these types of system, the main advantage is that they can easily
scale.

Chapter 3
Decentralized Computing
Paradigm
The advent of blockchain allowed to experiment more sophisticated ver-
sions of such protocols. It is becoming more clear that multiple protocols
could coexist on the top of Internet, bringing new possibilities when inter-
acting with the Web. When it was born, the Web was mainly composed by
read-only architectures, where the user had a one-way communication with
servers, and the ability to make a request and receive some sort of informa-
tion viewable in a browser. Today it is often referred as Web 2.0, because
new features have been added to it: search engines, social networks, user-
generated and uploadable content, the ability to use tags or extensions, and
so on. Especially, Web 2.0 is today an application platform. Such web appli-
cations are kept up by centralized intermediary entities, operating between
multiple parties involved a process. The term Web 3.0 instead, is often used
in contexts like Semantic Web, Artificial Intelligence, Internet of Things and
even Virtual Reality. In the Blockchain Paradigm however, which by the way
merges very well with the previously mentioned disciplines, Web 3.0 refers
to a next generation decentralized web. It allows to run Decentralized Appli-
cations on Decentralized Computing Platforms, and to govern Decentralized
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Autonomous Organizations. Direct connection between involved parties may
exist in a business process, allowing to skip intermediary entities in a lot
of case scenarios. This property helps to eliminate single points of failure,
expensive commissions, total data control by third parties, and breaks new
ground to emergent business models. This chapter aims to provide the basics
for decentralization as a paradigm, and how it could be used to define new
application types and organizations.
3.1 Smartcontracts
The most common way to formalize voluntary relationships between two
or more parties, whether enforced by a government or otherwise, is through
a contract. Centuries of cultural evolution and experience have given birth
to contracts and principles affiliated to it, which are the basis of a market
economy. The digital revolution however, introduced new types of relation-
ships between parties around the world. Digital media are indeed dynamic,
it means that beside vehiculating multi-sensory information, they are able to
make different kind of decisions. This idea that a transition is needed from the
traditional static paper-based solution, to a model where contractual clauses
can be embedded into software, called smartcontracts, was for the first time
discussed in [7] and rewritten in [8]. A crucial requirement for smartcontracts
is to be prohibitively expensive to violate for possible attackers, and this is
the exact feature that a blockchain provides. The main concept behind the
term smartcontract has slightly changed over time however, which is now
often used to indicate a generic portion of code that resides on a blockchain
network. A portion of code which is identifiable by a unique address, defined
as a set of state variables and functions, and executable when transactions
to its address are made. Alternative terms such as chain-code might be also
used for. The source code is viewable by anyone involved, so code is law :
many use cases doesn’t require a third party to enforce it.
In [44] and abstract definition of a smartcontract has been given, which
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includes both smart contract code and smart legal contract concepts. In this
thesis however, despite using similar terms, a smartcontract will be referred
as a smart contract code which resides on the blockchain. Such a smart
contract has the following ideal characteristics.
• enforceable, which means that the smartcontract is always executed as
defined, with deterministic behavior and no mediation;
• automatically executable when required conditions are met;
• tamper-proof, meaning that once started, its execution is unstoppable
and secure (against BFs in its environment).
A smartcontract is enforced by the underlying blockchain protocol. It is
automatically executed when triggering network transactions occur. Tamper-
proof property on the other side, isn’t a constant and may vary to certain
degrees among implementations. Another interesting property which is not
treated here, is the ability of a smartcontract to be understood by all humans,
too. If humans and machines can both understand a smartcontract, it is more
likely that a smartcontract will be valued in legal and social contexts.
Definition 3 (Smartcontract). A smartcontract is a tamper-proof computer
program which implements an automatically executable agreement, enforced
by the underlying decentralized consensus protocol.
Stateless and Stateful A smartcontract can be stateless, meaning that it
has no internal state. A form of stateless contract are the Bitcoin’s scripts:
they keep no data during execution. A stateful contract instead, can be ex-
pressed through more powerful constructs like loops, which allow to maintain
an internal state.
Vulnerabilities Smartcontracts could also have exploitable vulnerabilities,
like any other software. Attack vectors are more dangerous on stateful smart-
contracts where definition language provide complex high level constructs.
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Oracles and Contract Incompleteness A complete contract is an ideal
type of contract which encodes what is going to happen in every possible
scenario. On the other side, an incomplete contract depends on circumstances
and even real-time variables, which often makes them renegotiable in case
of unexpected events. These type of contracts has always been expensive to
execute. However, smartcontracts lower the transaction and information cost
related to incomplete contracts, making it accessible in more use-cases and
for a larger set of organizations. An oracle is an entity, or a group of entities,
that converts real-world information into data that can be processed by a
smartcontract. The main goal of an oracle is to provide sufficient contract
completeness, in order to make them definable in an algorithmic way, which
takes the form of a smartcontract. In other words, an oracle is a connection
between real world data and blockchain decentralized logic.
3.2 The Ethereum Implementation
As a result of various attempts to integrate the above principles into the
blockchain, the concept of a decentralized, programmable and transaction-
based state machine has emerged, resulting into the Ethereum proposal [15],
and into its further formalization [17]. In other words, Ethereum is a decen-
tralized computing platform and smartcontracts are its programs, currently
writable in a turing-complete language, and runnable by the Ethereum Vir-
tual Machine on each node. Ethereum smartcontracts are indeed stateful.
Bitcoin functionalities are implementable as an Ethereum application: with
its expressive power indeed, it contains the Bitcoin stack-based scripting
language. This section describes how Ethereum works and how its Smart-
contracts can be defined, deployed and executed.
3.2.1 Ethereum
With Script, Bitcoin allows to implement very weak forms of smartcon-
tracts. For example, an UTXO (Subsection 1.2) can be owned by multiple
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Figure 3.1: Blockchain and Smartcontract Technology Stack.
parties and unlocked only if all them agree to do it [16]. It is a stateless lan-
guage with limited expressive power, which has its advantages: no consensus
participant has to remember something and send to others; less attack vec-
tors; fast execution with guaranteed termination, and it is sufficient to per-
form payments. However, beside lacking higher level constructs like loops,
Bitcoin doesn’t allow the user to access blockchain variables, to interact with
its state, neither interact with some form of real-world data.
In order to create a programmable blockchain, Ethereum [15] provides a
built-in turing-complete programming language that is used to write smart-
contracts. Smartcontracts can be defined and deployed by anyone, in order
to govern a process according to their own rules.
Account types Ethereum has two account types:
1. Externally Owned Accounts (EOA), which is created and controlled by
a user through public and private key-pair, it is defined by its address,
the account keys and the ETH balance;
2. Contract Accounts (CA), where smartcontracts reside, are defined by
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their address, the contract code and ETH balance, too;
Any user can create an EOA. When the user starts a transaction in order to
deploy a smartcontract on the blockchain, a new CA is created. In order to
trigger the same smartcontract, a transaction (with eventual parameters) to
its CA address has to be made. The right to trigger a smartcontract code is
programmable, too.
3.2.2 Smartcontracts in Solidity
Several languages can be used to define an Ethereum contract, and every
definition can be compiled into bytecode. Bytecode is executable by Ethereum
Virtual Machines (EVM), that each full node runs. Initially available only as
a proof-of-concept, the first one was the Low-level Lisp-like Language (LLL).
Serpent1 is a Python-like language that can be used for the same purpose.
But the main language which is used to defined smartcontracts is Solidity.
With its contract-oriented paradigm in a C++ style, a Solidity smartcontract
reminds an object-oriented class definition. A smartcontract is composed by:
1. state variables, contract storage variables used to maintain the its state;
2. events, which can be used to track a contract execution, even from
outside Ethereum;
3. modifiers, used to change function behavior, they often check conditions
(like contract ownership) before executing a function;
4. functions, which include the code executed when transaction to CA are
sent.
Every smartcontract has also a constructor. Contracts can be compiled and
deployed as we will see in chapter 4.
Ethereum transactions modify the network state. Since Ethereum has
a built-in turing-complete language, several precautions have to be made in
1Serpent (https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Serpent).
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Unit wei babbage lovelace shannon szabo finney ether
Value (wei) 1 103 106 109 1012 1015 1018
Table 3.1: Denomination of Ether subunits and value.
order to avoid infinite loops on the network. A smartcontract computational
complexity is measurable in gas units. In fact, each atomic operation con-
sumes a certain amount of gas. A contract function is a combination of
operations. Each execution has a gasLimit in order to avoid a variety of
undefined behaviors. Beside specifying gasLimit, a user also tells how many
wei (the minimum sub-unit of an ether (ETH), Table 3.1) he is willing to pay
for a gas unit. The final transaction fee will be txfee = gasconsumed∗gasPrice.
In other words, the amount of gas specifies the transaction complexity, while
gasPrice is used to determine how fast the computation will happen. A
transaction has also a data field, which contains the transaction parame-
ters. A transaction data field contains a smartcontract bytecode for exam-
ple, when a contract is being deployed on the blockchain. Transactions to
EOA are fund transfers, a transaction to a CA are a method invocation.
Calls can be used for read-only operations on the network and don’t re-
quire fees. Calls don’t modify the network state. All smartcontract functions
which do not modify its state are callable for free.
3.2.2.1 Other Smartcontract Concepts
Roughly, Solidity is an object-oriented language, where an object always
belongs to a contract class. Upon decentralized environments however, other
paradigms could be used in order to define a smartcontract. An example will
be given. The Zilliqa platform [45], that has already been said to implement
the so called computational sharding (Subsection 2.4.1), uses dataflow pro-
gramming for its smartcontract layer. A smartcontract is represented by a
directed graph, where a graph node indicates an independent execution in
the program (functions and operations). When computing the smartcontract,
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each graph node can be assigned to a different shard. This approach could
guarantee a powerful decentralized parallel computing platform. Again, at
time of writing, this and other tools are still in early development phase.
3.2.3 Oracles
Oracles have been presented as entities which provide a link between
smartcontracts and real-world data (Section 3.1). This link is often required
because of a contract incompleteness property. This missing data is provided
through APIs. An oracle can be centralized, too, which means that a single
organization provides content for smartcontracts residing on blockchains2.
Some might argue that a single organization could provide arbitrary data to
smartcontracts. In this case, oracles can be also decentralized. A decentral-
ized oracle is an ecosystem of potentially competing data sources34 which
feed smartcontracts. Each decentralized oracle node is incentivized to do
so in a Bitcoin-like manner. Also, different mechanisms are introduced to
heavily discourage faulty behavior, like bringing false information.
3.3 Decentralized Logic, Storage and Mes-
saging
A global scale decentralized computer, as a vision, not only relies on a
decentralized logic, which the smartcontracts are. Communication protocols
as decentralized messaging [22], and peer-to-peer, self-sufficient decentralized
storage networks [18, 19, 20, 21], both with a built-in incentive system, are
also required. Once combined, these complementary technologies allow the
2Oraclize is an example of organization providing data to decentralized applications
(http://www.oraclize.it/).
3Chainlink is a decentralized oracle which aims to feed Ethereum smartcontracts with
requested information (https://www.smartcontract.com/).
4Mobius is a decentralized application marketplace which integrates decentralized ora-
cle principles (https://mobius.network/).
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full operativity of ecosystems of Decentralized Applications (dapp), as in
Figure 3.2. Decentralized applications existed before the blockchain advent
too, defined as applications which runs on top of a peer-to-peer network.
A dapp, as implied further in this thesis, has its own logic defined by a
set of smartcontracts that reside on the blockchain (with some variations),
that use decentralized messaging protocols to interact with each other, and
retrieve data from underlying decentralized storage. While eventually having
a presentation layer deployed on a central server, which is the only concept in
common with an app, to deploy a dapp will usually indicate running its parts
on a decentralized platform. For completeness, it can be said that dapps are
deployable whether including a proper token economy [24] or not. In this
way, in now avoidable requiring a large number of separate blockchains for
each dapp, too expensive for small organizations.
Decentralized applications can be developed to operate in a wide range
of domains. Some examples are:
• internet of things, which refers to devices that are connected to internet
and have unique identities. IoT devices can exchange or collect data
using blockchain based applications, with a smartcontract regulated
behavior. Some concrete examples are connected vehicles, smart home
devices, locks (which can be used to rent real-world physical objects)
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and parking;
• industry and manufacturing, decentralized applications can be used for
on-demand manufacturing (like 3D-printing), product traceability and
shipment, supply-chain tracking (for example, a pharmacological prod-
uct can be traced, to certify that it has not been exposed to dangerous
temperatures), product certification and so on;
• financial technology, decentralized applications could be used for pay-
ment platforms 5, insurance platforms, trading, investments and bank-
ing.
• records and identity management, dapp can be used to certify docu-
ment authenticity and their existence at a specific time point in history,
marriage and birth certificates, copyright protection and land registry.
3.3.1 Decentralized Autonoums Organizations
Dapps can be used to run Decentralized Organizations or Decentralized
Autonomous Organizations (DAO). Both of them can be viewed as orga-
nizations whose governance model is implemented as dapps, but unlike a
DO, a DAO is fully automated and does not require any input to execute
the logic. Successful public DAOs have been shown to be highly correlated
with community support, where none of multiple parties involved produce
the vast majority of commits [26]. Bitcoin is, actually, the first form of DAO
ever seen. Company-owned blockchain projects also started to proliferate,
especially through Initial Coin Offerings (ICO) [27], which is a process of
generating tokens and distributing them to parties, in return for the plat-
form’s native token or other currencies. Users are willing to buy these tokens,
if they value a product that will exist on a decentralized network, or will be
tied to it. While the necessity of an ICO might be questionable in some
cases, as well as the blockchain integration, new business models are now
5An example of such a platform is Request Network (https://request.network/#/)
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definable upon token economies, otherwise prohibitive to realize [28]. Later,
the idea of a Decentralized Autonomous ICO (DAICO) to be developed, has
also been proposed [29].

Chapter 4
Decentralized Certificate Issuer
This chapter will define the specific problem of how to write blockchain
data in such a way that (a), it is enabled to certify a generic occurred event
and (b) to be verifiable by anyone, anytime, in a trustless manner. Implemen-
tation cases will be provided for public ledger platforms. Since permissioned
and federated ledgers require all involved parties to trust each other and to
actively participate in the network, these type of systems aren’t suitable for
the problem given here.
4.1 Problem Definition
The problem requires to realize a decentralized application that is able to
issue certificates on the blockchain. At any point in the history, no trusted
third party should be needed to verify an issued certificate authenticity. It
is already known that a blockchain is a public, immutable and ordered dis-
tributed ledger. It provides all the necessary features to realize such appli-
cations.
Let’s assume that organization I is the certificate issuer. Let C =
{c0, ..., cn−1} be a set of entities authorized to interact with I. Given a
specific information infoci that ci has, ci should be able to ask I to perform
an event E(infoci , attachj). E(infoci , attachj) might be some service that
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I offers, where attachj is a proprietary information that initially belongs to
I. The content of infoci is irrelevant in this scope. At any point in the
history, I and even a subset of C might disappear. However, any entity
even outside C ∪ I, should be able to verify that E(infoci , attachj) actu-
ally happened somewhere in the past. ci will ask I to perform E multiple
times, so there will be a sequence (info0)...(infoT−1) for each ci. For every
request instance, I must perform the event and issue a blockchain certificate
cert(E(infotci , attachj)), such that:
(R1) with no trusted parties and whenever, anyone should be able to ver-
ify that for any i and t, cert(E(infotci , attachj)) exists and attachj is
unique.
The constraint (R1) ensures that I will not use its proprietary information
attachj for more than a single certificate. Such a mechanism has multiple
use-cases. For example, a University could use it to certify someone’s aca-
demic achievements. C could be its students, E(infotci , attachj) could be its
graduation or intermediate courses, and some company could be interested
to check authenticity of cert(E(infotci , attachj)). (R1) becomes more impor-
tant in other cases, where let’s say, attachj represent the identifier of a very
expensive product.
There is another factor to take in consideration. Since nodes must be kept
incentivized in order to run a protocol, blockchain services have a transaction-
based cost in terms of the platform’s native coin. These coins must be bought
by I on pairs like <COIN>/USD. DLT services on the other side, might be
additionally offered as a service, with time-based payments. A solution must
therefore be considered in terms of a second constraint:
(R2) each certificate deployment process performed by I should have a rea-
sonable operational cost.
Additionally, not too slow deployment processes are wanted.
(R3) each certificate deployment process performed by I should be confirmed
by the ledger after a reasonable amount of time.
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The practical work described in this chapter, aims to answer whether a dapp
that solves this problem is already implementable today or not. A dapp that
provides (R1), (R2) and (R3). And if not, what is the likeliness that it will
be achievable soon.
4.2 Dapp on Stellar
Stellar is a micro-payment oriented platform. With its federated internet-
level consensus model [47] it is relatively fast, and satisfies both following
constraints:
(R2) is satisfied, transaction are a combination of at most a few operations,
which have an extremely low cost of USD 0.0000041;
(R3) is satisfied, because Stellar network usually reach consensus in less than
5 seconds.
Constructs with full expressive power like turing-complete smartcontracts
are not currently offered by this platform, and likely will never be. Stellar
relies on simplicity and speed given by light-weight transactions, which in
turn are made of simple declarative operations. This approach requires the
issuer organization I to create a Stellar account for each customer ci, or an
account ownership by ci. Then, each deployed certificate to ci is represented
by a transaction to its account, with incorporated information that encodes
cert(E(infotci , attachj)).
JavaScript code in Figure 4.1 is given by an attempt to realize such a
dapp. As an architectural choice, in order to guarantee high throughput,
Stellar allows to only attach some very small data to its transactions. There
are two attachable data types we can be interested in2:
1At the beggining of year 2018, Stellar basic operation fee is XLM 0.00001 = USD
0.000004 (https://coinmarketcap.com/calculator/).
2Stellar Documentation (https://www.stellar.org/developers/guides/concepts/
transactions.html).
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Figure 4.1: Part of the JavaScript code that allows to perform a payment with
attached data, using StellarSDK.
1 var server = new StellarSdk.Server(horizonTestnet);
2 StellarSdk.Network.useTestNetwork ();
3
4 window.app = {
5 generateCertificate: function () {
6 var cert = {'info': 'Rafaello ', 'attached ': 'id'}
7 var hash = crypto.createHash('sha256 ');
8 hash.update(JSON.stringify(cert));
9 var memoHashHex = hash.digest('hex');
10
11 return memoHashHex;
12 },
13
14 issueCertificate: function () {
15 var certHash = this.generateCertificate ();
16 var issuerPair = StellarSdk.
17 Keypair.fromSecret(issuerPriv);
18
19 server.loadAccount(destPub)
20 .catch(StellarSdk.NotFoundError , function (error) {
21 throw new Error('Dest. account does not exist!');
22 })
23 .then(function () {
24 return server.loadAccount(issuerPub); })
25 .then(function(sourceAccount) {
26 var transaction = new StellarSdk
27 .TransactionBuilder(sourceAccount)
28 .addOperation(StellarSdk.Operation.payment ({
29 destination: destPub ,
30 asset: StellarSdk.Asset.native (),
31 amount: "1"
32 }))
33 .addMemo(StellarSdk.Memo.hash(certHash))
34 .build();
35 transaction.sign(issuerPair);
36
37 return server.submitTransaction(transaction);
38 })
39 .then(function(result) { /* result handling */ });
40 .catch(function(error) { /* error handling */ });
41
42 return;
43 }
44 }
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• MEMO TEXT: a string encoded using either ASCII or UTF-8, up to 28
bytes long;
• MEMO HASH: a 32 byte hash.
MEMO TEXT is too short to allow the dapp to attach useful information in most
applications. MEMO HASH could be an elegant solution to link arbitrary big
data to a transaction. The function defined at line 5 in Figure 4.1, converts
a test JSON to a hash string. When building a transaction (line 26), the
data hash can be added to it (line 33). Unfortunately, this is insufficient to
fully guarantee (R1). An external entity that wants to verify a certificate
authenticity, should retrieve first the certificate plain data from a trusted
party (I itself or some other trusted party). After data retrieval it would
be able to hash the certificate plain data, with the same algorithm. Only
then, the external entity would be able verify if the hash it has, matches with
the hash on the ledger. Transaction time confirmation and its cost satisfies
very well other constraints. However, Stellar is a good choice only if involved
parties are willing to sacrifice (R1).
4.3 Dapp on Ethereum
Ethereum allows to implement fully on-chain dapps, without third party
support in a wide imaginable use-cases. Explicit information can be stored
directly on the platform. In this way, given its immutability property, certifi-
cates would have blockchain-lifetime. Even in the worst case scenario with
all the Ethereum nodes going down, with C and I disappearing, the ledger
will continue to exist and computation might restart from a given commonly
agreed block. The dapp implementation and the possibility of (R1) will be
firstly discussed. Then, an analysis of deployment cost (R2) and time (R3),
and how are they linked, will be provided.
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4.3.1 Logic Definition - Fabric Pattern
Let’s suppose that I have already deployed a certain number of certificates
as smartcontracts. It would be very convenient to just query the blockchain,
and return a set of smartcontracts that match certain conditions (like in a
classic database). It would require to have the smartcontract template we are
in search for, as certificates are just a set of its instances with different data.
Alternatively, blockchain search engines for public data could be used. As
for now however, such functionalities are partially or not implemented at all.
To workaround this, the dapp that is going to be described uses the so called
fabric pattern. The fabric pattern in this case consists of two smartcontract
definitions, which interact as described below. When I receives a request
infotci from ci, it triggers an already deployed on the blockchain smartcon-
tract called Issuer. Issuer starts then an internal blockchain transaction
that creates Certificate with all its necessary data, as a result.
4.3.1.1 Certificate
cert(E(infotci , attachj)) could be encoded by the Certificate smartcon-
tract shown in Figure 4.2. The field issuer is the address of the contract that
created this instance, and issuerOwner is the addresses of I, which triggered
deployment process (line 4-5). ownerId and ownerInfo (line 7-8) refer re-
spectively to data which describe ci and info
t
ci
. At lines 10-11 productId
encodes attachj and date is the deployment timestamp. Certificate con-
structor (line 13) access global blockchain and transaction variables in or-
der to initialize some of these fields (msg, tx and block). Once created,
Certificate instances are read-only smartcontracts.
4.3.1.2 Issuer
First of all Issuer imports Certificate, it must contain its bytecode in
order to be able to deploy it. Once created at the very beginning, Issuer
can be used only by its creator I. This is ensured by the function modifier
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Figure 4.2: Solidity certificate definition.
1 pragma solidity ^0.4.18;
2
3 contract Certificate {
4 address public issuer;
5 address public issuerOwner;
6
7 uint256 public ownerId;
8 string public ownerInfo;
9
10 uint public productId;
11 uint date;
12
13 function Certificate(
14 uint id ,
15 string info ,
16 uint product
17 )
18 public
19 {
20 issuer = msg.sender;
21 issuerOwner = tx.origin;
22
23 ownerId = id;
24 ownerInfo = info;
25
26 productId = product;
27 date = block.timestamp;
28 }
29 }
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onlyOwner at line 11 in Figure 4.3, and owner is determined at construc-
tion time (line 18). issueCertificate(args...) function launches an
internal transaction to deploy a new certificate with its parameters, at line
28. At line 29, messaging system is used to launch a certificate creation
event (declared at 6) that should be eventually captured. The newly created
certificate address is saved on the blockchain too, in the certificates[]
array. In this way, anyone can retrieve deployed certificate addresses with
getCertificates() method (at line 37), for inspection.
4.3.2 Interacting with the Blockchain - Back End
Once the logic has been defined through Issuer and Contract, the re-
maining part of the dapp have to be implemented. First of all, the dapp
back-end must implement the following operations:
1. smartcontract deployment, which allow to deploy Issuer on the block-
chain, this will be required only once or very rarely;
2. issuance triggering, which allow to trigger the capability to deploy a
new Certificate, will be used very often;
3. transaction tracking, which means to capture and handle a Certificate
deployment progress;
4. information retrieval, allowing to get deployment history and to in-
sepect issued Certificates.
Listed operations define indeed our interaction with the Ethereum Blockchain
Network. In order to be able implement this interaction, a JavaScript API
is offered: Web3. Web3 provides a web33 object which in turn has various
sub-objects responsible for different tasks:
3The described dapp uses web3 1.0, which at the time of writing is in beta (https://
web3js.readthedocs.io/en/1.0/). Beta version usage is motivated by the introduction
of more high-level functionalities such as the PromiEvent construct.
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Figure 4.3: Solidity certificate issuer definition, imports certificate definition seen
in Figure 4.2.
1 pragma solidity ^0.4.11;
2
3 import "./ Certificate.sol ";
4
5 contract Issuer {
6 event LogNewCertificate(address certificate);
7
8 address public owner;
9 address [] public certificates;
10
11 modifier onlyOwner {
12 if (msg.sender != owner)
13 revert ();
14 _;
15 }
16
17 function Issuer () public {
18 owner = msg.sender;
19 }
20
21 function issueCertificate(
22 uint id ,
23 string info ,
24 uint product
25 )
26 public onlyOwner returns (address certificate)
27 {
28 Certificate newCert = new Certificate(id,
29 info ,
30 product);
31 LogNewCertificate(newCert);
32 certificates.push(newCert);
33
34 return newCert;
35 }
36
37 function getCertificates ()
38 public constant returns (address [])
39 {
40 return certificates;
41 }
42
43 function getTotalCertificates ()
44 public constant returns (uint)
45 {
46 return certificates.length;
47 }
48 }
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• web3.eth, blockchain and smartcontract related functionalities;
• web3.shh, whisper protocol for peer-to-peer communication;
• web3.bzz, swarm protocol for decentralized file storage;
• web3.utils, different helper functionalities.
Whisper and Swarm will not be used however during the realization of this
dapp, since they are not required. The package manager used is npm4 and
the JavaScript module bundler is webpack5.
var Web3 = require('web3');
For learning purposes Truffle6 framework has been initially used. How-
ever, at time of developing Truffle isn’t compatible with web3 1.0. There-
fore, the choice is to directly work with web3. Usually, when interacting
with dapps in a browser, dapp transactions require the user to pay some fee.
Another note regarding the learning curve is that a developer can (at least
temporarily) avoid wallet management when developing a dapp, by simply
using browser extensions such as MetaMask7. It provides an interface with in-
tegrated wallet management. When the dapp viewed in the browser starts an
Ethereum transaction, with user permission MetaMask automatically injects
web3 code which signs it cryptographically. Again, for account management,
direct work with web3 has been performed in order to achieve fully auto-
matic transactions. Another way to learn more easily dapp principles, which
has been used, is to initially interact with simulated on a local machine full
Ethereum clients. The tool used for this purpose is ganache-cli8.
4https://www.npmjs.com/
5https://webpack.github.io/
6Truffle is a full pipeline development environment with built-in capabilities
such as smartcontract compilation, linking and deployment on top of web3 (http:
//truffleframework.com/docs/).
7https://metamask.io/
8https://github.com/trufflesuite/ganache-cli
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Ethereum runs on its main-net, where users spend real amounts of ETH
in order make programmable transactions occur. Once the dapp is more
mature, but it is still too early to deploy it on the main-net, the developer
can use a test-net. Unlike a simulated environment offered by ganache-cli,
the test-net is a real network but still with fake ETH. It is useful to test how
the dapp behaves on public Internet with varying time delays. The test-net
used in this work is Ropsten. Both main and test-net require to run an
Ethereum client9 in order to interact with it. It is however avoidable, since
RPC access to Ethereum clients are also offered as a service. During this dapp
development infura10 access point has been used.
var testnet_provider = 'https://ropsten.infura.io/<user_id>';
var mainnet_provider = 'https://mainnet.infura.io/<user_id>';
In order to be able to perform and sign tasks that we are going to describe,
an Ethereum user account is needed. It can be created and managed through
web3 methods, or on interface sites like 11. A test-net account can be easily
filled with fake ETH12, while exchanges need to be used to buy ETH on the
main-net.
var account = '0x18ee6f47ab374776a7e42c4ff7bf8f8b7e319a98';
web3.eth.accounts.wallet.add('0x' + privateKey);
Below, the above mentioned operations and their implementation will be
described: smartcontract deployment, issuance triggering, transaction track-
ing and information retrieval.
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Figure 4.4: JavaScript Web3 Issuer compiling and instance creation.
1 getIssuerInstance: function () {
2 var contract = web3.eth.compile.solidity(issuerSource);
3
4 // extract ABI and Bytecode from compiled solidity code
5 var issuerAbi = contract.abiDefinition;
6 var issuerBytecode = contract.code;
7
8 // new contract instance
9 return new web3.eth.Contract(issuerAbi ,
10 {data: issuerBytecode });
11 }
4.3.2.1 Smartcontract Deployment
If I hasn’t yet an Issuer contract address to use, the first thing the dapp
will be used for is to deploy it. In order to be deployable, Issuer has to be
compiled. Issuer.sol can be compiled manually with solidity command line
compiler solc. However, the dapp should be able to compile it automatically
before each deployment. After being loaded from Issuer.sol, the Issuer
source code (Figure 4.3) is compiled through web3.eth.compile13 like in
Figure 4.4 at line 2. The returned datatype contains the abstract binary in-
terface (abi) and the executable bytecode, which are required to create a new
contract instance (line 9). The returned instance however, still owns no ad-
dress because it has not been yet deployed on the blockchain. A deployment
process is a transaction because it modifies the state of the blockchain. De-
ployment is performed by calling issuerInstance.deploy(args...). The
related transaction is tracked in the same way as later will be seen in Figure
9http://ethdocs.org/en/latest/ethereum-clients/choosing-a-client.html
10https://infura.io/
11https://www.myetherwallet.com/
12Enter the account address in order to receive test-net ETH (http://faucet.ropsten.
be:3001/), or, through APIs (https://github.com/sponnet/locals-faucetserver#
api).
13web3.eth.compile can also compile contracts defined in other languages like LLL and
Serpent.
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4.5, for a Certificate creation.
4.3.2.2 Issuance Triggering
Once the Issuer is on the blockchain we can trigger its methods and de-
ploy Certificates. Figure 4.5 shows the newCertificate(args) method
which instantiate a new Certificate, with its parameter args that con-
tains both infotci and attachj. At lines 2-3 a new web3 Issuer object is
created, and its address field is set with the address value at which Issuer
is already deployed. Variables declared at line 5-6 will be used to update
the front-end which will be discussed later. Before instantiating however, it
is necessary to retrieve approximated transaction parameters. When calling
estimateGas() upon the issueCertificate(args) method (line 11-12),
a transaction is simulated by an Ethereum client but with no final state
change. The amount of consumed gas is returned as the simulated gasLimit.
web3.eth.getGasPrice() instead, returns the median of last few blocks, of
the amount of wei that users paid per each gas unit (line 9-10). It is re-
minded that wei is an Ethereum sub-unit. As seen in Chapter 3, the final
transaction fee will be gasLimit * wei. This information could be used by
I to understand the network state and to decide whether to accept or lower
the transaction fee. After that, at line 15-16, the web3 Issuer instance
method issueCertificate(args) is invoked as a transaction. It is done
through .send() where sender account, wei and gasLimit are specified.
4.3.2.3 Transaction Tracking
A PromiEvent is a JavaScript promise combined with an event emitter.
Promises are combined with event management constructs like on, once and
off. Each of these is executed when the Ethereum network reaches various
stages of an action, and we are looking for its results. For example, we would
like to capture events like a transaction creation, its block confirmation or to
eventually handle Ethereum Virtual Machine thrown errors.
A certificate deploying has been triggered as a transaction at lines 15-16
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Figure 4.5: JavaScript Web3 Certificate deployment handling.
1 newCertificate: async function(args) {
2 var issuerInstance = this.getIssuerInstance ();
3 issuerInstance.options.address = issuerAddr;
4
5 var txTable = document.getElementById('tableCerts ');
6 var row;
7
8 var wei , gasLimit , tx;
9 await web3.eth.getGasPrice ()
10 .then(function(res) { wei = res });
11 await issuerInstance.methods
12 .issueCertificate(args).estimateGas ({from: account })
13 .then(function(res) { gasLimit = res });
14
15 issuerInstance.methods.issueCertificate(args)
16 .send({ from: account , gas: gasLimit , gasPrice: wei })
17 .once('transactionHash ', function(txHash) {
18 row = txTable.insertRow (1);
19 row.insertCell (0); row.insertCell (0);
20 var cell = row.insertCell (0);
21 row.cells [0]. innerHTML = txHash;
22 this.sendBack(txHash);
23 })
24 .on('confirmation ', function(confNumber , receipt) {
25 row.cells [2]. innerHTML = confNumber;
26 if (confNumber >= MIN_CONFIRMS)
27 row.cells [2]. innerHTML = 'Full';
28 })
29 .on('error ', function(error) { this.handleError(tx) })
30 .then(function(receipt) {
31 issuerInstance.methods.getTotalCertificates ().call()
32 .then(function(res) {
33 var nrCerts = document.getElementById('nrCerts ');
34 nrCerts.innerHTML = res;
35 });
36
37 row.cells [1]. innerHTML = receipt.
38 events.LogNewCertificate.returnValues.certificate;
39 this.HTMLupdateBalance ();
40
41 return newCertAddr;
42 });
43
44 return;
45 }
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in Figure 4.5. Once transaction hash creation event occurs on the network
(line 17), the promise is executed and the web page of I is updated with a
new hashed transaction (lines 18-21). The txHash could be also sent back
to ci enabling him to track the transaction by its own (line 22).
Each time a new block is appended after the block which contains our
transaction, a new confirmation occurs. A confirmation event is handled
at line 31. A transaction here in considered fully confirmed if it reaches
MIN CONFIRMATIONS confirmations, which is 24. Otherwise, if after a certain
number of blocks appended to the ledger the transaction is still unconfirmed,
an error event is thrown (line 29). Currently, in web3 1.0 beta this limit
is 50 blocks. An EVM could throw other errors, like insufficient gas or lack
of execution rights, resulting into a machine state reversal. These an other
exceptions can be handled by handleError(tx). In case that I wants to
rise the gas price in order to speed up confirmation, a transaction with the
same nonce should be rebuilt and propagated again on the network, with a
slightly higher wei parameter.
What has been triggered however, is a chain of two transactions. The
first transaction has been launched explicitly by the web3 code. The second
internal to the blockchain transaction is started by the Issuer contract itself
(Figure 4.3, line 28). The received through promises receipt only provides
information about the first transaction. The second transaction, creates the
smartcontract that encodes cert(E(infotci , attachj)). Certificate address
is communicated through a solidity event instead (Figure 4.3, line 31), that
is captured on the web3 back-end side in Figure 4.5 at lines 37-38. An
intuitive representation of the transaction deployment and tracking process
can be observed in Figure 4.8.
4.3.2.4 Information Retrieval
Methods to retrieve information from Issuer are going to be described.
First of all, it can be seen in Figure 4.9 that the number of total deployed
certificates is displayed. This is achieved by performing an explicit call()
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on the Issuer method seen in Figure 4.3 at line 43, which is a read-only
function:
issuerInstance.methods.getTotalCertificates().call().then(...)
Calls do not modify anything, no fee is required. Therefore, I ∪C and other
entities can read cert(E(infotci , attachj)) whenever they want. Let’s say now
that all certificates ever deployed are wanted. Read-only contract methods
like getCertificates() in Figure 4.3 at line 37 can be defined, which returns
an array of deployed certificate addresses or a chunk of:
...
7: "0x2fFed016976aA1d37247d45c6e54F601F5a347d8"
8: "0x57c3B7954b8138E2AE2677E192432D1946Dc9d4e"
9: "0x1d843847f5f73842Dc0402803c5C9269f38aA113"
10: "0xae70a3993565278896d2cadF0A87D1B0CE97e1b0"
11: "0xbD2d50B8f921A911184b9EF2bC16C62F773dC1Cb"
12: "0xf7CD9Ee298D8C4Fa17898190559914B9D823f93b"
13: "0x86EBB57605F73a2d8F7d047c5296D63df1cD5e6E"
...
web3 code in Figure 4.6 shows how, for example, it is possible to retrieve
deployed certificates and view their owners. At line 2 a web3 Certificate
object is built. When getCertificates() is called and it returns the array
at lines 4-5, a loop can be performed where at each step we (1), change the
web3 Certificate object address and (2), access the desired smartcontract
information through another call (like ownerId, line 9).
4.3.3 Solution analysis
Requirement (R1) is fully satisfied, because:
(R1) with no trusted parties and whenever, any entity knowing Issuer’s
address on the blockchain is able to verify for any i and t, if
4.3 Dapp on Ethereum 71
Figure 4.6: JavaScript Web3 Issuer compiling and instance creation.
1 getDeployedCerts: function () {
2 var cert = self.getCertificateInstance ();
3
4 issuerInstance.methods.getCertificates ().call()
5 .then(function(res) {
6 for (i = 0; i < res.length; i++) {
7 cert.options.address = res[i];
8
9 cert.methods.ownerId ().call().then(function(ret) {
10 console.log(cert.options.address , 'owner is', ret)
11 });
12 }
13 });
14
15 return;
16 }
cert(E(infotci , attachj))
exists and attachj is unique.
Before analyzing the remaining two requirements some note is necessary
to take about the network state. At time of testing the deployed dapp on
the main-net, Ethereum experienced one of the greatest network loads ever,
as it is observable in Figure 4.7. (R2) and (R3) requirements will be shown
in a worst case scenario. Deployments occurred at approximately 1 million
tx/day, which is close enough to all time high values at time of writing this
thesis.
It has been shown in Section 2.3, that at the current state of develop-
ment, decentralized and consistent systems S like Ethereum should centralize
in order to satisfy enormous transaction demand T (S). Since Ethereum still
maintained a certain degree of decentralization and full global T -consensus,
the amount of pending transactions increased. In this scenario, in a con-
gested system where users want their transaction to be confirmed sooner,
they will be willing to rise transaction fees in order to be selected first by the
14https://bitinfocharts.com/comparison/ethereum-transactionfees.html#1y
72 4. Decentralized Certificate Issuer
(a) Ethereum average transaction fee expressed in USD.
(b) Ethereum transactions per day processed.
Figure 4.7: Charts describing the Ethereum Network workload in January 2018,
when the Issuer dapp has been realized (source14).
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gas price
test-net (ropsten) main-net
txFee confirmation txFee confirmation
4Gwei
EUR 1.21
45s
EUR 1.26
480s
ETH 0.00134 ETH 0.00140
9Gwei
EUR 2.71
39s
EUR 2.71
1080s
ETH 0.00302 ETH 0.00302
20Gwei
EUR 6.64
33s
EUR 6.039
90s
ETH 0.00738 ETH 0.00671
40Gwei
EUR 12.09
42s
EUR 12.09
17s
ETH 0.01343 ETH 0.01343
Table 4.1: Transaction fees and required confirmation time at different gas price
values. gasLimit is fixed because determined by computational com-
plexity which is static, and 1 ETH exchange rate is fixed at 900 EUR.
miners (consensus participants). This behavior however, leads to an over-
all increase of commissions (Figure 4.7a), and transactions with previously
acceptable fees will be more likely be put in the wait queue. This is where
the Decentralized Certificate Issuer has been tested, and the results can be
observed in Table 4.1. The test-net is irrelevant to see any relation between
confirmation time and fees, it has been reported for completeness. On the
main-net however, it is sufficiently clear that rising the fee resulted into a
faster transaction confirmation time.
(R2) states that deployment operations should occur at a reasonable cost.
However, it is up to I to decide what is reasonable. In a micro-transaction
environment, where transactions occur very often in order to certify frequent
events, the presented solution may still not be acceptable for a real-world
business. Otherwise, if events to certify are more rare and real world costs re-
lated to E(−) are high for I, a blockchain certificate deployment cert(E(−))
usefulness could exceed by far its fee.
(R3) requires that a deployment network confirmation should occur after
a reasonable amount of time. On public ledgers, a deployment process is
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asynchronous. Meaning that even if it is fast, I shouldn’t block its execution
in order to wait deployment to occur. I should evaluate how much urgency
the deployment has: can it happen even after hours, or at most a few seconds
are allowed? As Table 4.1 shows, the answer to this question is closely related
to (R2), too.
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infotci
Request
E(infotci ,−)
Perform
E(infotci , attachj)
Injoke fee estimation
cert(E(infotci
, attachj))
Simulate
Deployment
cert(E(infotci
, attachj))
Fee Decision
Invoke Deployment
cert(E(infotci
, attachj))
Propagate
Transaction
Send ci txHash
View txHash
in explorer
Wait
X time
Receipt
arrived?
Consensus
Reaching
Send certificate
address to ci
Receive certifi-
cate address
No
Yes
ci U web3 Ethereum
Figure 4.8: A diagram that intuitively shows how a deployment process occurs
with web3.
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Conclusions
It has been seen that Bitcoin simultaneously provides system availability,
partition tolerance and a relaxed form of consistency. This consistency type
guarantees in a probabilistic manner that consensus will be reached in the
near future instead. It is also known now, that Bitcoin consensus resiliency
in fully asynchronous environments like Internet could be only lowered by
time unbounded message delays. A secure, Proof of Work based blockchain
system, should guarantee that the number of ledger writings is proportional
to the author’s computational power. It has been discussed that a distributed
system isn’t automatically decentralized, and that a system is decentralized
as much as it is its most centralized subsystem. The main desired properties
in a blockchain architecture are (i) political and architectural decentraliza-
tion, (ii) scalability to transactional demand and (iii) consistency. However,
it is now clear that in order to maintain consistency at scale, blockchain
systems tend to centralize. This is, indeed, the main challenge that public
distributed ledgers are currently facing. Beside reparametrization, multiple
research and development directions have been taken in order to solve it: al-
ternative consensus algorithms, multiple chain aggregation techniques, logic
and cryptographic enhancements.
Blockchain’s immutability feature gives a great opportunity to write in-
formation that must persist over time. The first requirement (R1) that such
a dapp should satisfy, states that certificate content and authenticity must
be verifiable by everyone, whenever, with no trusted party involved (certifi-
cate author included). For a real-world business however, a solution should
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furthermore provide (R2) an appropriate certificate deployment fee and (R3)
acceptable temporal confirmation delays. Ethereum has been used to realize
a decentralized application with certificate deployment functionalities. In
order to be able to certify a given event on the blockchain, the fabric pattern
has been adopted. It consists into having a main Issuer smartcontract which
always resides on the blockchain. Each time its methods are triggered by the
owner, it creates a new Certificate smartcontract with the given parameters.
The dapp has been tested in the middle of January 2018, while Ethereum
was experiencing a nearly all-time-high workload of 1 million tx/day. The
following conclusions have been made about the previously discussed require-
ments:
(R1) is fully satisfied, because any entity, with no trusted party and when-
ever, is able to retrieve all certificate addresses and their content by
only having the address which issuing organization used;
(R2) an appropriate transaction cost should be defined by the organization
controlling the dapp. However, during the dapp testing, various trans-
action fees have been set, from the lowest possible (at the time) 1.26
EUR up to 12.06 EUR, which can be definitely prohibitive for frequent
micro-transaction based environments;
(R3) of course, confirmation time delay tends to be inversely proportional to
the fee, at a fixed network workload. At the highest tested 12.06 EUR
fee confirmation time was 17s, and 90s at 6.04 EUR. While for some
organizations might be acceptable a confirmation time of 8 minutes for
a fee of 1.26 EUR, for other ones it might be unacceptable.
Observed (R2) and (R3) drawbacks are explainable by the DCS Theorem.
Ethereum maintained the same level of full consistency and decentralization,
therefore it was unable to satisfy a growing transactional demand. Since
pending transaction increased, users started to offer higher fees in order to
be preferred by miners. It caused an overall average fee increase. It can
be said that currently, high fees and longer confirmation time are closely
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related to scalability problems. Currently, the main approach to overcome
the scalability problem is to sacrifice (R1).
A method of how to relax the (R1) requirement, to lower fees and confir-
mation delays, has been seen on the Stellar platform. There are no smartcon-
tracts, and a certificate can be encoded by a transaction with an appended
certificate hash, from the issuer to the requester account. However, in order
be able to verify the hash (meaning the certificate content), the verifying ac-
tor must still retrieve plain data from a trusted party. The required off-chain
support is clearly in contrast with (R1). On the other side, confirmation time
is less than 5s and a transaction fee is usually much less than a single cent,
which makes Stellar to fit into micro-transaction environments.
Private, permissioned ledgers aren’t the focus of this thesis, some notes
however have to be made. This ledger type, by totally rejecting decentraliza-
tion provides high throughput, full consistency and comparatively low costs.
Ledgers as a Service such as solutions based on Hyperledger Fabric, can be
used if trustless systems aren’t required. Such solutions however, require all
the actors (that trust each other) to be active participants within the net-
work. Certificated data could potentially lose any validity if its actors cease
their activity.
Future Works
The conclusions made in this work are to be taken as a state snapshot
of public distributed ledger technologies. Blockchains can be still consid-
ered in their early stage development. Scalability is currently considered the
most urgent problem to solve. Smartcontract enabled decentralized com-
puting platforms, are not only rapidly evolving into more sophisticated ver-
sion of themselves, but also new solutions are emerging. Sharding-enabled
platforms, side-chains, alternative data-structures and consensus algorithms,
scalability-friendly cryptographic primitives, are still to be widely experi-
mented. Therefore, a wide range of future works can be considered:
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• in the fabric pattern each deployment consists of two transactions: the
triggering one and the internal transaction which creates a certificate.
By avoiding this pattern, the dapp could use a single cheaper trans-
action. In order to be able to query a blockchain, a search-engine-like
mechanism is required. Given a certificate definition, such a tool would
allow to find its instances on the blockchain. A future work consists
into finding such tools that are currently in development phase, evalu-
ate them and implement the related dapp;
• Ethereum, in its ”2.0” version, will implement an hybrid consensus
model based on Proof of Work and Proof of Stake, features such as
state-sharding, and possibly zero knowledge proofs. After a sufficiently
relevant evolution, a future work could consist of retesting the scala-
bility of this platform;
• feasibility study and implementation on currently immature platforms
should be made. Conceptually different public distributed ledgers are
now being developed, too. Some examples follow. The discussed dapp
feasibility could be studied on platforms like the already cited Zilliqa
[45], which scheduled its main-net launch in year 2018. IOTA [48]
on the other side, is a currently under development ”blockchain-less”
protocol based on a direct-acyclic-graph data structure. IOTA’s most
interesting feature is the absence of fees, where for each transaction,
its author should validate two already existing on the network transac-
tions.
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